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The Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in Egypt and Tunisia: The 
Untold Story 
For decades, the subsidisation of energy has been a pervasive feature of economies across the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA). By supplying electricity, gas, and petrol to households and companies 
at prices well below the world market average, MENA energy importers and exporters alike have made 
energy subsidies a hallmark of their industrial policy and a key pillar of their social contract. Though 
the goals of this policy – facilitating industrialisation and attenuating social inequalities – may be 
commendable, energy subsidies have come at a huge price for MENA economies. The estimated cost 
of energy subsidies amounts to about 8.5 percent of regional GDP or 22 percent of government 
revenues (IMF estimates for 2011). As a whole, the region accounts for half of global energy subsidies. 
The fiscal burden of this policy has been particular heavy for relatively resource-scarce and labour-
abundant countries in the region, such as Tunisia and Egypt, which by the early 2010s have both 
become net energy importers and have thus seen their budget put under strain, in particular during 
periods of high oil prices. 
Evidence pointing out the manifold distortions of energy subsidies in MENA have not been in short 
supply. Alongside financial concerns, existing studies have particularly highlighted deleterious effects 
on the environment, the undue reliance on energy-intensive industries, and the generally regressive 
distributional consequences of energy subsidies. The latter point is particularly damning as in most 
countries energy subsidies are an important, if not the only, pillar of otherwise underdeveloped social 
safety nets and often dwarf other welfare expenditures, such as health and education.  
Given the manifest shortcomings of subsidised energy and the persistent advice on the part of 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to reform, the absence of a meaningful overhaul of the status 
quo is indeed striking. While some of the difficulties to reform might lie with limited institutional 
capacity and problems of implementation, most explanations have underlined the importance of the 
political economy of energy subsidies to explain the persistence of the status quo. By far the most 
widespread argument in this context is the alleged fear of governments’ of a popular backlash and 
attendant unrest in response to subsidy reductions.  
While especially in the light of the Arab Spring this argument seems pertinent, it is incomplete and 
overlooks obstacles to reform stemming from unintended, yet powerful and politically connected 
beneficiaries of energy subsidies. After a brief outline of recent reforms of energy subsidies and a 
summary of the ‘standard’ political economy explanation, I will highlight the importance of these 
actors – politically connected businessmen (PCBs) and the army – in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. By 
demonstrating the extent to which these actors are present in subsidised sectors and often specifically 
enter because of energy subsidies, I argue that these actors have become key stakeholders in the 
status quo and have used their leverage to water down reform attempts. Thus, any meaningful reform 
will have to come to terms with this group of actors.  
 
Energy subsidies in Tunisia and Egypt 
Tunisia has established a system of extensive energy subsidies in the form of cheap electricity, gas, 
and petrol. Since the state has acted as a quasi-monopolist in the production and provision of energy, 
energy subsidies take the form of a monopolist price setting by the state, with prices generously below 
the level of the world market. Tunisia was a net energy exporter from the early 1970s until the late 
1990s and was able to provide cheap energy from its own domestic resources in this period. With 
falling production levels and increasing consumption, the country has turned into a net importer of 
energy in the late 1990s, having to import nearly 30 percent of its energy needs by 2015. As energy is 
supplied at below world market prices, the resulting deficit of Tunisia’s two main energy providers 
(STIR for oil; STEG for gas and electricity) is covered by transfers from the state budget. With the rapid 
rise of oil prices during the most recent oil boom, the costs of subsidised energy have hovered 
between 4 and 6% of GDP or about 13% of the total expenditures over the past 10 years, and only 
abated recently as a result of falling world market prices.  
To alleviate this fiscal burden, the authorities introduced an automatic indexing mechanism of local 
petrol prices on the world market price in 2009, which was repealed shortly after the uprisings in 2011. 
In the wake of the ouster of President Ben Ali and under the aegis of an IMF-led stabilisation 
programme, the Tunisian government increased the price of fuel by 7% in 2012 and 2013, and also 
hiked up electricity and gas prices for medium-voltage consumers by 20% in 2014. The authorities also 
reintroduced the automatic indexing mechanism for petrol and began the gradual fading out of energy 
subsidies for a few energy-intensive industries, such cement, textiles, ceramics, and food processing. 
On the whole, though, there has been no serious attempt at a systemic overhaul of energy subsidies 
post-2011.  
Like Tunisia, Egypt has also maintained an extensive system of energy subsidies, which offers energy 
products, such as petrol, gas, and electricity, at favourable rates below the world market price. While 
energy subsidies have never been ‘cheap’ in Egypt, the costs soared after the 2011 uprising as Egypt 
transitioned for a net exporter to a net importer of energy and oil prices peaked as a result of political 
turmoil in MENA . In 2013 and 2015, energy subsidies thus amounted to nearly 16 and 10% of GDP 
respectively.  
In view of Egypt’s strained post-2011 budget, successive governments have carried out a number of 
price increases, such as in July 2014 when prices rose by as much as 78% for most consumers, including 
low-income households. In the same vein, the Sisi administration reduced subsidies for a number of 
energy-intensive industries, such as cement, fertiliser, and glass and ceramics. Another wave of 
electricity and fuel price increases occurred in late 2016 in the run up to the conclusion of Egypt’s 
recent IMF programme when the government increased fuel prices and electricity prices for 
households between 30 and 50%; increases for commercial consumption were considerably lower. 
While the stated goal of the government is to phase out all energy subsidies within a 5-year period, 
the main policy measures to date have consisted of ad hoc price increases which have overall 
maintained comparatively low domestic prices. For example, the most expensive price for fuel and 
electricity still only represent 32 and 0.6% of average US prices respectively.  
 
The Told Political Economy Story: Mobilised Beneficiaries  
In both countries, the reluctance to reform energy subsidies is attributed to past popular revolts 
against price hikes of subsidised goods. Food riots in response to food subsidy cuts are believed to 
have left a particularly enduring legacy. In Tunisia, these events hark back to a series of riots that lasted 
from December 1983 until January 1984. Representing the worst violence since independence, 
protests left about 100 people dead and caused considerable devastation as a result of rioting and 
plundering. In view of the public discontent, Bourguiba first announced to reduce the price increase 
by 50%, before scrapping the measure entirely a few days later.  
In Egypt, the major event dates back to 18 January 1977 when President Sadat announced price 
increases for a number of subsidised food items, such as rice, tea, and gas cylinders for households. 
Demonstrations against the measures first broke out in Egypt's centre of steel production, Helwan, 
and quickly spread to the urban centres of Cairo, Alexandria, and other big cities, mobilising industrial 
workers, students, state employees, and, to a lesser extent, the urban poor along the way. As 
demonstrations rapidly turned violent, with administration buildings and consumer centres being 
attacked and burnt, a state of emergency was declared in several provinces and the regime deployed 
the army for the first time since 1952 to quell the unrest. Rioting only stopped after Sadat repealed 
the measures on 20 January. The army had to be called upon a second time when minor increases in 
the price of bread prompted rioting in the textile centre of Kafr al-Dawwar in 1984.  
Evidence for the long-lasting effect of these events can be found in statements of policy-makers and 
archival sources alike. For example, Monceur Rouissi, former minister and personal advisor to 
President Ben Ali, described the subsidy issue as a ‘nightmare for all successive governments, too 
sensitive to be reformed’ (personal interview, Tunis 2013). And according to former and current 
Minister of Supply, Ali Moselhi, there is ‘a real fear’ of the government to touch the subsidy issue as a 
result of past unrest (personal interview, Cairo 2012). Archival sources point in the same direction. 
References to the food riots are paramount in the correspondence between the Egyptian government 
and the IMF, which was declassified in the early 2000s. Therein, the Egyptian government repeatedly 
insisted throughout the 1990s that ‘the pace of reform had to be geared to the likely public reaction.’  
 
The Untold Story: Politically Connected Actors 
Fear of consumer unrest is the predominant narrative to explain the persistence of subsidisation. 
Though important, this narrative is incomplete without giving due attention to another group of 
beneficiaries from energy subsidies which have become an important lobbying group against major 
reform. In both countries, the untold story of the political economy of subsidy reform revolves around 
two key actors: politically connected businessmen (PCBs) and, in the case of Egypt, the army.  
To understand this point, it is important to briefly explain how private sector actors benefit from the 
system in place. Regarding energy subsidies, it is first and foremost the energy-intensive sectors that 
reap an important part of the energy subsidies. These include, on the one hand, energy-intensive 
manufacturing sectors, such as cement, textiles, and chemical products. On the other hand, energy 
subsidies disproportionally benefit companies in the transport and logistics sector, which heavily rely 
on subsidised fuel. 
To demonstrate how these actors have affected the system of energy subsidies, I rely on a novel 
dataset on PCBs and the Egyptian army that I compiled together with Adeel Malik at Oxford. Regarding 
PCBs, the dataset records the entry and presence of PCBs in Egypt and Tunisia at the four-digit level 
of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, Rev. 3.1) since 1997. As for the Egyptian 
army, the dataset only records the presence and not the entry of the army in ISIC 4-digit sectors and 
is thus time-invariant (for a detailed note on the methodology, see Eibl, Malik CSAE Working Paper 
2016-27). The dataset seeks to capture Ben Ali- and Mubarak-era ‘cronies’, yet most of the identified 
actors can still be considered politically influential post 2011. The only exception are companies 
belonging to the Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan as these were subject to confiscations.  
Based on this dataset, my argument relies on three important pillars:  
1. Presence in heavily subsidised sectors 
Figure 1 below summarises the presence of politically connected actors in Egyptian and Tunisian 
manufacturing sectors in 2010. Failing a direct measure of energy subsidies to each sector, energy 
intensity is arguably the best proxy to capture the extent to which businesses benefit from energy 
subsidies. Clearly, as Figure 1 below shows, political connected actors in Egypt and Tunisia display a 
significantly higher presence in sectors that benefit from energy subsidies. While Egyptian PCBs are 
‘only’ present in 60% of low energy intensity sectors, their presence in sectors with high energy 
intensity amounts to nearly 80%. The picture for the Egyptian army and Tunisian PCBs is similar, albeit 
at lower levels: their presence is, respectively, 22 and 14% higher when comparing low to high energy 
intensity sectors. 
While these descriptive figures are no evidence that these actors enter sectors because of energy 
subsidies, they nonetheless highlight the fact that politically connected actors have been amongst the 
major beneficiaries of energy subsidies.  
Figure 1: Sectoral presence of PCBs and army by energy intensity 
 
Note: Manufacturing sectors only. Classification of energy intensity taken from UNCTAD.  
 
2. Entry into sectors because of energy subsidies  
There is also evidence to suggest that politically connected actors enter sectors because of energy 
subsidies. Establishing this point is important as the entry into a sector because of energy subsidies 
gives us a much stronger indication of the importance of energy subsidies for these actors and, by 
extension, their (un)willingness to give them up in the future. For example, if it turned out that PCBs 
in Egypt enter sectors for reasons other than energy subsidies – such as skill intensity, level of imports 
and exports, etc. – this would suggest that they would not be a major obstacle to subsidy reform. If, 
on the other hand, energy subsidies are a primary factor driving entry into a sector, we would expect 
considerable resistance to systemic change given that their business model is, at least partly, 
predicated on the presence of cheap energy supplies. We would thus expect noticeable lobbying 
activity against subsidy removal.  
To test this claim, I run a number of pooled and conditional fixed effects logit models which both 
suggest that the energy intensity – as a proxy for subsidies – is a key determinant of entry into a sector. 
This finding is particularly pronounced for PCBs in Egypt. The model takes the entry of ‘cronies’ as the 
dependent variable and a binary indicator of high or low energy intensity as the main explanatory 
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variable. It further controls for other confounders, such as level of tariffs, exports, imports, broad 
sectoral fixed effects, and skill intensity.  
The most striking result can be found in the case of PCBs in Egypt, displayed in Figure 2 below. It shows 
that the average probability of an Egyptian PCB entering a sector is about 3% for low and medium 
energy intensity sectors, which increases to about 27% for high energy intensity sectors. With the 
average probability of PCB entry being 4% in the sample, this represents a significant increase and 
demonstrates the importance of energy subsidies in the entry decisions of politically connected 
entrepreneurs in Egypt. As for the Egyptian army, the results (not displayed) suggest that the army is 
about three times less likely to be present in low energy intensity sectors than in medium or high 
energy intensity sectors (21 vs. 65%). Only in Tunisia I could not find a systematic association between 
energy intensity and PCB entry. Taken together, this suggests that resistance from politically 
connected actors against subsidy reform should be expected to be higher in Egypt than in Tunisia. 
 
Figure 2: PCB entry and energy subsidies in Egypt 
 
Note: Predictions based on observed values from pooled logit model. Whiskers show 95-
percent confidence interval. 
 
3. Observed lobbying of politically connected actors against subsidy reform 
There’s anecdotal evidence that politically connected actors have used their leverage to lobby against 
subsidy reductions. For example, in July 2016 the head of the Federation of Egyptian Industries, 
Mohamed El Sewedy, declared that cutting natural gas prices for manufacturers is ‘better for the 
state’s budget’ and would ‘help reduce the budget deficit’ as the benefits would outweigh the direct 
financial costs for the state. His lobbying efforts were met with partial success as the government 
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High energy intensity
reduced gas prices from USD 7 per mmBtu to USD 4.5 per mmBtu for steel producers – despite the 
looming IMF agreement at the time and the stated goal of reducing energy subsidies. While this 
anecdote cannot be more than an illustration, it is nonetheless indicative of the important veto 
powers politically connected actors wield in the context of subsidy reform.  
